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A Different Kind of "Republican Moment"
in Environmental Law
Richard J. Lazarus
t
A little over a decade ago, Professor Dan Farber was the
first to suggest that modern environmental laws may have
resulted from a "republican moment"-an "'outburst[] of
democratic participation and ideological politics'-created by
widespread and then-rising public demand for environmental
protection.1  The term "republican" invokes the political
tradition referred to as "civic republicanism," which stresses
the willingness of individuals to undergo sacrifices to promote
the public good.2 Farber posited that the "original 1970 Earth
Day looks very much like a 'republican moment.' An estimated
20 million Americans participated in a variety of public events
that day. More than 2000 colleges, 10,000 high schools and
elementary schools, and 2000 communities took part."3
t Copyright © 2003 by Richard J. Lazarus, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks are owed to John Podesta, Lois
Schiffer, Anne Shields, Gary Guzy, and John Leshy, all of whom provided
comments on an earlier draft, and to Kelly Moser, Georgetown University Law
Center Class of 2003, for her valuable research assistance. Most of all,
Michael Doherty, Georgetown University Law Center Class of 2001, deserves
great credit for creating the database that serves as the basis for the graphs of
congressional voting that appear in this article. See infra note 58.
1. Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 59, 66 (1992) (quoting James G. Pope, Republican Moments:
The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 287, 292 (1990)).
2. Id. at 66 (citing Pope, supra note 1, at 311).
3. Id. Farber does soften his hypothesis somewhat, however, by
subsequently acknowledging that "the term 'republican moment' may be
misleading" in this context "to the extent that it suggests that very short
periods of high-pitched public interest alternate with periods of nearly total
public apathy." Id. at 67. According to Farber, a "continuum" more accurately
depicts the role of public opinion in promoting environmental protection law:
"Earth Day of 1970 represented a peak, but there have been lesser peaks of
public pressure sparked by events such as Love Canal or Three Mile Island.
In between these peaks, public attention is lower, but not nonexistent." Id.
Much of modern environmental law can, accordingly, be further explained as
resulting from legislative responses to major environmental crises, such as the
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The theoretical significance of such a "republican moment"
lies in the contention that, without such a moment,
environmental protection laws would never exist because of
their radically redistributive nature. Environmental protection
laws are invariably redistributive; they impose substantial
costs on some and confer substantial benefits on others.4 For
that reason, the institutional barriers to the enactment of such
laws are particularly high; there are always political forces
ready to resist their enactment and, under our nation's
lawmaking system, it is much easier to stop a law from being
enacted than to secure legislation.
What makes the hurdles impeding the enactment of
environmental protection laws even higher than for most
redistributive laws is not just the threshold fact that the
identity of those who benefit from the laws often differs greatly
from those who must absorb their costs. The primary source of
those obstacles is the spatial and temporal distribution of the
costs and benefits associated with environmental protection
laws. Because of the nature of ecological cause and effect, the
benefits and costs of environmental protection are naturally
spread over great spatial and great temporal dimensions.
Costs are imposed by restricting activities in locations that may
be far removed physically-by hundreds and even thousands of
miles-from the places that enjoy the benefits of those
restrictions.5  Similarly, costs are imposed by restricting
activities that are occurring at times that may be far removed
temporally-not just by years but potentially by decades and
even centuries-from those future generations who will enjoy
the benefits of those restrictions.6 Consequently, politically and
economically powerful vested interests in the here and now are
invariably ready to oppose the enactment of laws that will
benefit those elsewhere or in the future. Moreover, because of
the expansive spatial and temporal dimensions of analyzing
such cause and effect, there is almost always a fair amount of
scientific uncertainty in assessing the benefits, while the more
immediate economic costs appear to be far more concrete and
"burning" of the Cuyahoga River, Love Canal, or the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
4. This is not to suggest, of course, that those who pay substantial costs
enjoy no corresponding benefits or that those who enjoy benefits pay no costs.
The disparities are not so absolute. It is a matter of degree and
proportionality.
5. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to
Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 249-53, 256-62 (2000).
6. Id. at 253-55, 262-65.
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certain.7 Only during a "republican moment," scholars such as
Farber have argued, is it possible to overcome the otherwise
preclusive barriers that exist to the enactment and
implementation of meaningful environmental legislation.8
The purpose of this Essay is to propose and discuss the
possibility that the nation currently faces another, albeit very
different, "republican moment" that may well test the future of
environmental protection laws in the United States. This new
"moment" has as its modifier an uppercase "Republican" rather
than a lowercase "republican." While the latter "republican"
invokes the political tradition referred to as "civic
republicanism," the former "Republican" refers instead to the
current National Republican Party. The "moment" facing
environmental law is the virtually unprecedented ascendancy
of the Republican Party in all three branches of the federal
government.9
I. THE DEMISE OF BIPARTISANSHIP IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Thirty years ago, the mere suggestion of a partisan divide
in environmental protection law would likely have been treated
as an anathema. At the time of environmental law's first
"republican moment," environmental law was popularly
celebrated as bipartisan in keeping with the notion of the
existence then of a widespread public consensus favoring
7. My faculty colleague, Lisa Heinzerling, however, has well explained
how the purported costs of environmental protection law may be far more
uncertain than it appears and susceptible to great exaggeration. See Lisa
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981,
1984-86 (1998).
8. A more complete discussion of the factors that make environmental
lawmaking especially difficult and how those factors have influenced
environmental law's evolution since the early 1970s is contained in my
forthcoming book, The Making of Environmental Law, to be published in 2003
by the University of Chicago Press. Some of the discussion in this essay is
derived from that book, including some brief excerpts from the current draft
manuscript.
9. Although the Republican Party was similarly dominating all three
branches of the federal government at the very outset of the presidency of
George W. Bush, that dominance was both extraordinarily thin-with fifty
senators elected from each party-and short-lived because the Republican
senator from Vermont, James Jeffords, declared soon thereafter that he would
vote to provide the Democrats with the majority necessary for the opposition
party to ascend to the leadership positions in that legislative chamber. See
Katharine Q. Seelye & Adam Clymer, Senate Republicans Step Out and
Democrats Jump In, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at Al.
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stronger environmental protection laws. Indeed, it was the
bipartisan nature of the environmental movement that
enhanced its attractiveness. In the late 1960s, the nation was
otherwise reeling from an onslaught of socially divisive political
issues, ranging from the Vietnam War to civil rights.
Environmental protection provided a much needed opportunity
for Americans to rally around a positive, aspirational objective
for the future. Whether because of genuine personal beliefs or
political self-interest, both of the major political parties quickly
proclaimed themselves supporters of stronger environmental
laws.
It was, accordingly, Republican President Richard Nixon
who seized upon the environmental issue with great gusto early
in his term.'0  Nixon signed into law the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)11 with much fanfare on
January 1, 1970.12 In February of that year, the president
delivered to Congress a far-reaching and ambitious agenda for
environmental legislation in his "Environmental Message."13
In December, Nixon created the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)' 4 and, on the very last day of the year, signed
into law the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,15 which
established the nation's first sweeping pollution control law.
During this time period, Democrats held the leadership
positions in both the House and Senate and unabashedly
competed for the environmental mantle with Republicans in
Congress and in the Nixon White House. Congress passed
sweeping laws by overwhelming majorities as no one from
either political party wanted to be seen as the enemy of
environmental protection. As summed up by one legislator,
explaining his reluctant vote in favor of safe drinking water
legislation in 1974, "After all, if one votes against safe drinking
water, it is like voting against home and mother."1 6 The
10. See J. BROOKS FLIPPEN, NIXON AND THE ENVIRONMENT 50-79 (2000).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000).
12. FLIPPEN, supra note 10, at 50-52; see National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
13. Richard Nixon, The President's Message to Congress Recommending a
37-Point Administrative and Legislative Program, 6 WKLY. COMPILATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 160 (1970).
14. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. § 1072 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 184 (2000).
15. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(1970).
16. 120 CONG. REC. 37,594 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Cotton).
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average votes in favor of major federal environmental
legislation during the 1970s was seventy to five in the Senate
and 331 to thirty in the House. 17
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 were the product
of the combined (albeit not necessarily cooperative) efforts of
President Nixon and congressional leaders in the Democratic
Party, including Senator Edmund Muskie who chaired the
influential Senate Committee on the Environment and Public
Works.18 Other prominent congressional Democrats supporting
strong environmental legislation included Senator Gaylord
Nelson who promoted the idea of the first "Earth Day,"' 9 and
Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson who pioneered NEPA through
Congress. 20  At the same time, vocal skeptics of strict
environmental laws included prominent Democrats, most often
from the South, such as Alabama's Jamie Whitten, who chaired
the House Appropriations Committee and who notoriously
boasted that he could undermine the stringency of
environmental laws through the budgetary process.2' On the
other hand, some of the nation's most celebrated environmental
leaders included many members of the Republican Party,
including early EPA Administrators William Ruckelshaus and
Russell Train, and congressional leaders such as
Representative Paul McCloskey of California. 22
Finally, the leading environmental judges of the 1970s
included judges nominated by both Democratic and Republican
presidents. For instance, D.C. Circuit Judge Skelly Wright was
nominated by President Kennedy, and Second Circuit Judge
James Oakes was nominated by President Nixon.23 Judge
17. Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of
Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at
311, 323. These lopsided votes on the final bills enacted by Congress,
however, may well mask a series of closely contested votes on various
amendments to specific parts of the bill.' Id. at 323 n.47.
18. E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326-29 (1985).
19. See, e.g., GAYLORD NELSON ET AL., BEYOND EARTH DAY: FULFILLING
THE PROMISE 105-63 (2002).
20. See Henry M. Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the Courts,
and the Congress, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1970).
21. Lazarus, supra note 17, at 338.
22. Beverly Beyette, Earth Day Observance: The Day Politics Stood Still,
L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1985, available at 1985 WL 2181382; Peter Milius, What
Presidents Do: Decant Some Wine from New Bottles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1980,
at A4.
23. Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts,
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Wright famously wrote for the D.C. Circuit that it was now the
"judicial role" to ensure that important environmental policies
"heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in
the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy." 24 Judge Oakes
still sits on the federal bench and, during the past three
decades, he has earned a reputation for consistently promoting
aggressive application of environmental protection require-
ments. 25
Today, however, a starkly partisan divide exists in
environmental law. Notwithstanding the persistence of
remarkably similar rhetoric by candidates for elected office
from the two major political parties, the two parties represent
very different views on the efficacy of existing environmental
protection law and the need for its reformation. 26  These
differences are not matters of incidental emphasis or tone; they
express starkly contrasting visions of both the substantive ends
as well as the means of environmental law. The Republican
Party generally favors less stringent environmental controls
and increased resource exploitation, 27 while the Democratic
Party generally favors stronger environmental protection
standards and resource conservation and preservation laws.2 8
Much of the substantive policy disputes derive from
differing attitudes towards the use of discount rates in
assessing the benefits of environmental controls as well as
differing degrees of faith in the ability of future technological
http://www.c.gov/newweb/netweb.nsf/ic-bio (last visited Feb. 18, 2003).
24. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
25. See, e.g., James L. Oakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 498 (1977) (urging "more active judicial participation in the
evolution of environmental law"); Lois J. Schiffer & Timothy J. Dowling,
Reflections on the Role of the Courts in Environmental Law, 27 ENVT'L L. 327,
332 (1997) (stating that Judge Oakes has been singled out as being
"particularly instrumental in the progressive development of our
environmental laws").
26. See Jonathan Cannon & Jonathan Riehl, Presidential Greenspeak:
How Presidents Talk About the Environment and What It Means 1-21 (Dec.
2000) (unpublished working paper draft, on file with author) (discussing the
"presidential rhetoric on the environment from 1970 to the present").
27. See Republican National Committee, American Partners in
Conservation and Preservation: Stewardship of Our Natural Resources,
http://www.rnc.orgfGOPInfo/Platform/2000platform6.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2003) (describing the 2000 platform for the Republican Party).
28. See Democratic National Committee, The 2000 Democratic National
Platform: Prosperity, Progress, and Peace, http://www.democrats.org/about/
2000platform.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2003).
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innovation to obviate the need for controls now. For instance,
the higher one discounts the value of future benefits created by
environmental protection laws, the less significant those
benefits appear to be in determining today whether they are
worth the more immediate and certain costs of pollution
controls and resource conservation measures.2 9 So too, the
more one is willing to discount as just another future
monetizable benefit the human lives saved in the future from
environmental controls today, the less necessary those present
environmental controls become. 30 Finally, the more optimistic
one is about the ability of future technology to address
environmental problems or to provide ready substitutes for
some natural resources, the less worthwhile it seems to
undertake economic sacrifices now. In 1970, there was no
discernible divide between the two parties on these underlying
assumptions. As described in more detail below, that no longer
seems to be true today.
The differences in viewpoint and outlook between the two
major parties, however, extend even further and deeper. They
are fundamentally opposed on matters of lawmaking principles,
including the extent to which private property rights to natural
resources should be protected, the efficacy and neutrality of
market forces, and the necessity of a strong national
government on matters of public health and welfare.
Contemporary leaders of the Republican Party, including both
those holding elected office and those within the party's
professional staff, are far more persuaded of the inviolability of
private property rights in natural resources than are their
Democratic counterparts,31 who are more likely to be persuaded
of the need for government regulation because of the spatial
and temporal spillovers caused by unrestricted resource
29. See Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the
Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND L.
REV. 267, 279-87 (1993); Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the
Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2069-77 (1999).
30. Compare John J. Donohue III, Why We Should Discount the Views of
Those Who Discount Discounting, 108 YALE L.J. 1901 (1999) (arguing that
discounting and cost-benefit analysis is a tool that should be used in
regulatory decision making), with Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108
YALE L.J. 1911 (1999) (rebutting Donohue's argument).
31. See, e.g., Republican National Committee, supra note 27,
http://www.rnc.org/GOPInfo/Platform/2000platform6.htm ("We link the
security of private property to our environmental agenda for the best of
reasons: Environmental stewardship has best advanced where property is
privately held.").
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exploitation. 32 Furthermore, those in the Republican Party are
more accepting of the proposition that market forces provide an
efficacious and neutral basis for the allocation and distribution
of the nation's natural resources wealth. 33 Democrats are more
willing to perceive the limitations of the market in this respect
and to question the market's alleged "neutrality."34
The partisan divide in environmental law has deepened to
such an extent in recent years that it is now evident in the
workings of all three branches of the federal government. As
described below, each of the branches displays the effects of
such a divide, ranging from the legislative branch, where it is
most expected, to the judicial branch, where it is not.
A. ExECUTIvE BRANCH
The first two years of the George W. Bush administration
make quite plain the depth and extent of the chasm growing
between the two political parties on environmental protection
policy. The current administration has sought to reverse
almost all of the major environmental initiatives promoted by
the Clinton administration at the EPA and the Departments of
Agriculture and of the Interior. Reminiscent of the early years
under President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, the new
administration immediately undertook a series of widely
publicized changes in the direction of national environmental
policy that drew the condemnation of environmentalists, the
32. See infra note 34.
33. See Republican National Committee, supra note 27,
http://www.rnc.org/GOPInfo/Platform/2000platform6.htm ("Our way is to trust
the innate good sense and decency of the American people. We will make
them partners with government, rather than adversaries of it ..... Wherever it
is environmentally responsible to do so,, we will promote market-based
programs that are voluntary, flexible, comprehensive, and cost-effective.").
34. See, for example, Democratic National Committee, supra note 28,
http://www.democrats.org/about/2000platform.html, which states,
The Republicans have tried to sell off national parks; gut air, water,
and endangered species protections; let polluters off the hook; and put
the special interests ahead of the people's interest. They are wrong.
Out [sic] natural environment is too precious and too important to
waste.
And we must dramatically reduce climate-disrupting and
health-threatening pollution in this country, while making sure that
all nations of the world participate in this effort. Environmental
standards should be raised throughout the world in order to preserve
the Earth and to prevent a destructive race to the bottom wherein
countries compete for production and jobs based on who can do the
least to protect the environment.
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protest of leaders in the opposing political party, and the
attention of the national news media. 35  President Bush
appointed Gale Norton and Spencer Abraham, prominent
supporters of increased natural resource development, to head,
respectively, the Department of the Interior and the
Department of Energy-two of the most important environ-
mental policy-making positions in the federal government. 36
Based on the advice of Secretary Abraham and others, the
president quickly took the dramatic step of unilaterally
withdrawing the United States from the Kyoto Protocol on
Climate Change.37 After weeks of meetings with industry
leaders, the vice president subsequently announced a new
national energy policy that, environmentalists contend,
reflected the priorities and economic interests of White House
allies in the energy industry. 38 Environmentalists argued, in
particular, that the new energy policy favored more domestic
oil production and less environmental protection and paid little
attention to conservation opportunities.39
Both the EPA and Interior likewise have since steadfastly
pursued policy changes that provoked accusations that
business interests are being unduly favored at the expense of
35. See, e.g., Editorial, Clueless on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2001, at A24; Editorial, Grizzlies at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2002, at 14;
Editorial, Landscapes Under Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at A30; Alison
Mitchell, Democrats See Gold in Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2001, at
20; Editorial, More Environmental Rollbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at
A10; Editorial, Nature Overrun, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at A22; Editorial,
No Greens Need Apply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, at 12; Editorial, Park
Rangers With Respirators, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at A20; Editorial, Parks
Under Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at A26; Editorial, Poor Marks on the
Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A14; Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush
Team Is Reversing Environmental Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at A20.
36. Thomas B. Edsall, Federalist Society Becomes a Force in Washington:
Conservative Group's Members Take Key Roles in Bush White House and Help
Shape Policy and Judicial Appointments, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2001, at A4.
37. David E. Sanger, Bush Will Continue to Oppose Kyoto Pact on Global
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at Al; see Douglas Jehl & Andrew C.
Revkin, Bush, in Reversal, Won't Seek Cut in Emissions of Carbon Dioxide,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at Al.
38. NAT'L ENERGY POL'Y DEV. GROUP REP., NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY:
RELIABLE, AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR
AMERICA'S FUTURE (2001); Editorial, One-Way Discussion on Energy, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at A30; David E. Sanger, In Energy Plan, Bush Urges
New Drilling, Conservation and Nuclear Power Review, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
2001, at Al.
39. Don Van Natta, Jr. & Neela Banerjee, Bush Energy Paper Followed
Industry Push, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at A20.
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environmental protection. The EPA withdrew (only to later
reinstate in the face of widespread criticism) the Clinton
administration's stricter arsenic standard for drinking water,40
promulgated changes in Clean Air Act rules that undermined
the basis of a major enforcement initiative launched by the
Clinton administration against major stationary sources of air
pollution,4 1 suspended and then reversed new, very ambitious
Clinton administration regulations to implement the Clean
Water Act's water quality standards, 42  announced its
opposition to a reauthorization of the Superfund tax on
industry for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites,43 and relaxed
rules barring the disposal in valleys and streams of thousands
of tons of fill from "mountaintop mining."44
Similarly, at the Department of the Interior, Secretary
Gale Norton took a series of steps that abruptly changed
Interior policy from that formulated under the prior Democratic
administration and then-Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt. Secretary Norton eliminated strict Clinton
administration environmental regulations and bonding
requirements applicable to mining on public lands,45 authorized
oil drilling near national parks,46 barred the reintroduction of
grizzly bears to the northwest, 47 reversed the Clinton
40. Douglas Jehl, E.P.A. to Abandon New Arsenic Limits for Water
Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2001, at Al; Katharine Q. Seelye, E.P.A. to
Adopt Clinton Arsenic Standard, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at A18.
41. Matthew L. Wald, E.P.A. Says It Will Change Rules Governing
Industrial Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2002, at Al. For the EPA's "New
Source Review" rules, see 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186 (Dec. 31, 2002). For the
Agency's proposed complementary changes to the meaning of "routine
maintenance," see 67 Fed. Reg. 80,290 (Dec. 31, 2002).
42. 66 Fed. Reg. 53,044 (Oct. 18, 2001) (amending 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(1));
Eric Pianin, EPA Jettisons Clinton Rule on Cleaning up Waterways, WASH.
POST, Dec. 21, 2002, at A2.
43. Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush Proposing Policy Changes on Toxic Sites,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at Al; Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush Slashing Aid for
E.P.A. Cleanup at 33 Toxic Sites, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at Al; Editorial,
Shortchanging Superfund, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2002, at A12.
44. Editorial, Burying Valleys, Poisoning Streams, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2002, at A12.
45. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,834
(Oct. 30, 2001) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3800); Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush
White House Reverses Clinton Decision on Mining, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001,
at A14.
46. Timothy Egan, Bush Administration Allows Oil Drilling Near Utah
Parks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A14.
47. Seelye, supra note 35.
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administration policy to reopen Yellowstone National Park to
snowmobiling, 48 and reduced a Clinton administration two-year
mining moratorium on one million acres under consideration
for national monument designation to a ban of new mining on
only 117,000 acres of the land.49 The Secretary has also
spearheaded the administration's effort to open up the Alaska
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil exploration and
development, which the Clinton administration had
consistently opposed.50
Finally, the Forest Service has rejected two major
environmental initiatives that the Clinton administration
promoted. The first called for enhanced environmental
protection in forest service planning both by enhancing
environmental review and by imposing greater substantive
limits on the extent to which activities in the national forests
could impinge on environmental values, especially species
diversity.5' The Bush administration first postponed the
effectiveness of those rules and more recently proposed new
rules that significantly scale back on substantive and
procedural forest planning requirements. 52 The second major
Clinton initiative from which the Bush administration Forest
Service is apparently retreating concerns protection of roadless
areas in national forests. The Forest Service promulgated
highly protective rules at the very end of the Clinton
administration.5 3 The Forest Service has since stepped away
from actively defending those rules from industry court
challenge, which reportedly prompted the resignation of both
the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Forest Service. 54
48. Park Rangers With Respirators, supra note 35.
49. Interior Ends Clinton Mining Moratorium on 1 Million Acres in
Southwestern Oregon, [33 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1208 (May
31, 2002).
50. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Interior: Drilling Won't Violate Polar
Bear Pact, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2002, at A23; Michael Grunwald, Warnings
on Drilling Reversed, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2002, at Al; Don Van Natta Jr.,
Video Inspires New Dispute over Alaska Refuge Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2002, at A22.
51. The prior Clinton administration rules were published at 36 C.F.R. pt.
219 (2002).
52. 66 Fed. Reg. 27,552, 27,555 (May 17, 2001) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt.
219); see Robert Pear, Bush Plan Gives More Discretion to Forest Managers on
Logging, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at Al. The Forest Service's newly
proposed rules are set forth at http://www.epa.gov/nsr/rm-rule.pdf.
53. 66 Fed. Reg. 3244 (Jan. 2001) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294).
54. Douglas Jehl, Forest Service Chief Quits, and Asks Bush to Hold Firm,
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B. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
The notion that a partisan divide exists in Congress is
hardly shocking. After all, unlike the other two branches of the
federal government, the entire organizational structure of
Congress is expressly premised upon the existence of such a
meaningful partisan divide; there is the "majority" party and
the "minority" party. The leadership of committees, the
number of committee staff, and the ability to bring bills to the
floor and to a vote, all derive from a legislator's affiliation with
a political party, whether that particular party is in the
majority. Accordingly, partisan politics result.
The increasingly partisan nature of environmental politics
in Congress during the past thirty years is nonetheless quite
striking, but because of its increased intensity rather than its
mere existence. To provide some measure of that phenomena
in the legislative branch, I undertook an examination over time
of the environmental voting record of members of Congress on
environmental issues during the past thirty years. I used as
the basis for my review the scoring of individual members of
Congress that is performed each year by the League of
Conservation Voters (LCV).55 The LCV bases its scores on a
member's vote on certain bellwether environmental issues
during each session of Congress. A member of Congress is
awarded positive scores every time she or he votes in favor of
positions that the LCV has identified as supportive of
environmental protection policies.5 6 Accordingly, a legislator
who has voted on every occasion in such a manner receives a
score for the year or legislative session of "100," while a
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at A19; Elizabeth Shogren, A Natural Split with
Bush, and Many Quit-Environment: Longtime, Key Officials Who Favor
Conservation Say They Are Frustrated by New Rules, L.A. TIMES, June 3,
2002, at Al. The Ninth Circuit nonetheless recently upheld the Clinton
administration Forest Service rules, which environmental groups defended by
intervening in the case, Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
25467, at *4 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2002). The court of appeals reversed a district
court decision that had enjoined implementation of the Clinton administration
roadless rules. Id.
55. The LCV is a nonprofit environmental organization that describes
itself as the "political voice of the environmental movement and the only
organization devoted full-time to shaping a pro-environment Congress."
League of Conservation Voters, About LCV, at http://www.lcv.orglabout/
index.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2003).
56. LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, 2002 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
SCORECARD (2002), available at http://lcv.org/pics/pdfs/scorecard02final.pdf
(last visited Jan. 24, 2003).
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legislator who has voted in opposition to those policies receives
a score of "0."57 Because the LCV has regularly tabulated these
scores since 1971, which essentially marks the beginning of the
modern environmental law era in the United States, these data
are extraordinarily revealing of political trends over time.58
The results of this survey are reproduced on the following
pages in a series of graphs. The findings that can be fairly
drawn about the voting patterns of Democrats and Republicans
from these results are several and set forth below. Some relate
to the Congress as a whole. Some relate more to one chamber
rather than the other. Finally, some break the partisan voting
trends down even more to consider the extent to which the
partisan' divide may have increased more or less in various
geographic regions of the country. One quite obvious pattern
evident throughout is the impact of the dramatic shift of
southern conservatives from the Democratic to the Republican
Party since the early 1970s.
57.. See id.
58. Compilation of this data was, however, an enormous undertaking
masterfully performed by a recent graduate of the Georgetown University Law
Center, Michael Doherty, Class of 2001, while he was my student research
assistant. It required his creation of a database for each year that included all
of the LCV scores for individual members of Congress for each legislative
session, organized both by political party and by geographical region of the
country. It also required Doherty's ensuring that the many incidental changes
in LCV's scoring system over time (e.g., treatment of abstentions and
absences) did not demonstrably affect the reported trends, which he
accomplished by recreating what the LCV scores would have been had
precisely the same scoring system been used throughout the thirty-year
period. Finally, Doherty had to account for numerous permutations, including
both individual members leaving office or even their switching political parties
in the middle of a term of office.
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Graph 1: Senate LCV Scores, 1971-2000
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100
80
60
U 40
20
A
1972 1974 I 1976 1 1978 1980 1 1982 1984 11981 1990 1 1992 1994 1996 1999 2000
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985/86 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Years
I - Democrats
............... Republicans
Combined
*.,,,
0
"REPUBLICAN MOMENT"
1. Finding 1 (Graphs 1 and 2)
The average LCV scores in Congress remained essentially
the same between 1971 and 2000 in both the Senate and
House. Indeed, the scores for the two endpoints (1971 and
2000) for each chamber are essentially identical, between 40 to
50 for both. There is some movement within the thirty years in
terms of the average scores, including a high average score
peak in the Senate in 1978 over 60, and a longer period of
higher scores in the House in the 1980s of between 50 and 60.
Notably, a comparison of the scores in the House and the
Senate shows that the average scores of the two chambers are
roughly the same, with the Senate slightly decreasing over time
and the House slightly increasing over time.
2. Finding 2 (Graphs 1 and 2)
The average LCV scores of the Democratic members of
Congress have been consistently higher than their Republican
counterparts for the entire thirty-year period reviewed. That
has been true for both legislative chambers. The difference,
however, between the average scores of the Democratic and
Republican members has dramatically increased over time in
both chambers. In the House, the difference between the
average LCV scores of the two parties was only about 9 points
in 1971 (Democrats (45) and Republicans (36)), but increased
by more than sixfold to approximately 58 points by the year
2000 (Democrats (77) and Republicans (19)). In 1971, the
difference in the average scores in the Senate was
approximately 27 points in the Senate (Democrats (57) and
Republicans (30)), but that difference increased more than
twofold to approximately 71 points by 2000 (Democrats (81)
and Republicans (10)).
3. Finding 3 (Graphs 1 and 2)
The LCV scoring trends suggest that there were several
distinct moments during which the two parties split further
apart on environmental issues. In the Senate, the disparity in
voting remained fairly constant, with the LCV scores going up
and down together from 1971 until 1988. In 1989, however, in
the aftermath of the election of President George H.W. Bush,
the two parties plainly commenced to stake out very different
positions on environmental issues. At that time, the scoring
trends worked in opposition to each other, rather than in
parallel fashion. The Senate Democratic scores began to rise
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somewhat sharply while the Republican scores simultaneously
declined just as sharply. In the House, the end result is
similar-a growing divide between the two political parties-
but the pathway to that result has been a bit different. In the
early 1970s, during the first year of President Nixon's second
term, the House Democratic scores veered significantly up,
while the House Republican scores declined even more. Then
again in 1980, the House Democratic scores continued to
increase significantly, and the House Republican scores
decreased somewhat. Finally, foreshadowing what was to occur
in the Senate a year or so later, in the early 1990s, the House
Republican scores began to decrease precipitously while the
House Democratic scores generally rose to higher levels than
ever before.
Graph 3: Senate LCV Scores, 1971-2000, by Regions
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Graph 4: House LCV Scores, 1971-2000, by Regions
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4. Finding 4 (Graphs 3 and 4)
Examination of regional trends in the voting of all
members of Congress, regardless of political party affiliation,
reveals high volatility in the scoring patterns over time.59
While sometimes the trends are parallel (up together or down
together), quite often they are not. This strongly suggests not
only partisan divides but also some regional divides on issues of
national environmental policy. In other words, there are
national environmental laws that either the costs or benefits of
which disproportionately favor or disfavor one region of the
country over another. These differences, however, are largely
59. The graphs that divide the nation regionally are based upon the
following classifications: (1) Northeast: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Maryland; (2) Midwest: Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio,
Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Minnesota; (3) Southwest: Texas, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, Arkansas, New Mexico; (4) Southeast: Virginia, South Carolina,
North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, West
Virginia, Kentucky; (5) Mountain: Colorado, Idaho, Wyoming, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, Utah, Montana; and (6) West: Washington,
California, Nevada, Oregon, Hawaii, Alaska, Arizona.
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discernable in the scores of the Senate, rather than the scores
of the House. For the House scores, the relative movements of
the scores of members of Congress are more synchronized and
consistent than those in the Senate. To the extent that many
environmental laws tend to impose short-term costs and yield
longer-term benefits, the difference between the two chambers
may, in this respect, reflect the notion that senators are better
politically able to take a longer term perspective than are those
in the House, who must be responsive to two-year election
cycles.
Graph 5: Senate LCV Scores, 1971-2000 (Democrats by
Regions)
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Graph 6: Senate LCV Scores, 1971-2000 (Republicans by
Regions)
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5. Finding 5 (Graphs 5 and 6)
Examination of regional trends in the voting of senators,
distinguishing between the members based on their party
affiliation, shows that there has been a remarkable geographic
convergence within both parties, albeit in precisely opposite
directions: The Democratic Senate scores went up while the
Republican Senate scores went down. For each party,
differences between regions generally diminished over time.
6. Finding 6 (Graphs 5 and 6)
The extent of the convergence is underscored by simply
comparing the two endpoints of the survey: 1971 and 2000. In
1971, both the Democratic and Republican Party scores for the
Senate were almost evenly spread out. The high Democratic
score was in the 80s and the low Democratic score was in the
low 20s. The other four regional scores for the Democratic
senators hovered around 40, 60, and 80. Similarly for the
Republican senators, there were two high scores tied in the
mid-40s and a low score just below 10. The other three regional
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scores for the Republican senators were around 10, 20, and 30.
By contrast, by the year 2000, the scores within both parties
had, with a notable exception converged; they were no longer so
spread out.
7. Finding 7 (Graphs 5 and 6)
The degree of convergence in LCV scores was substantial
for both of the major political parties, but even greater for the
Republican senators, largely because the scores for several
regions decreased to 0. For the Democrats, the LCV score for
each region increased, and rather than being spread out over
more than 60 points as in 1971, scores were spread out over
fewer than 40 points, with four regions fewer than 20 points
apart. The biggest single change occurred in Southeastern
Democrats, who had the lowest regional score in 1971, more
than 60 points lower than the highest score; but, by 2000, the
Southeast contingent had increased by almost 60 points, to only
about 15 points lower than the leaders in the Midwest. Over
the next thirty years, the Northeast Democratic senators
generally maintained the highest LCV scores. With the
exception of the Northeast Republican senators, even greater
regional convergence occurred within the Senate Republicans.
In the year 2000, the Southeast, West, and Southwest
Republican senators shared the same LCV score of 0, the
Mountain Republican senators had a score lower than 5, and
the Midwest Republican senators had a score of about 15. The
Northeast Senate Republicans stand alone by defying any such
convergence; their LCV score in 2000 is essentially the same as
it was in 1971, although they had much higher LCV scores for
almost all of the time period in between, maintaining scores in
the high 60s and low 70s from 1973 through the mid-1980s.
8. Finding 8 (Graphs 5 and 6)
One of the most dramatic occurrences during the past
thirty years is the contrasting nature of changes in LCV scores
between Southeast Senate Democrats and Southeast Senate
Republicans. Both started at virtually the same spot in 1971,
with LCV scores just above 20. But, during the next thirty
years, the Democratic scores increased by more than 60 points
to over 80, while Republican scores decreased as much as they
possibly could-to 0. One obvious explanation is that the
enormous discrepancy simply reflects the general abandonment
of the Democratic Party by southern conservatives since the
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1960s and the corresponding rise in number and power of
Southern Republicans. 60 The LCV scores are in that respect
largely a symptom of that abandonment. Environmental
protection matters were not themselves necessarily a
precipitating event for that occurrence.
9. Summary of Findings
Taken together, what the LCV scoring trends make plain is
that the political partisanship dramatically increased in
Congress between 1971 and 2000. What began in 1970 as a
relatively bipartisan political issue has become, thirty years
later, a largely partisan issue about which there is little
common ground between the two political parties,
notwithstanding their common political rhetoric in
campaigning. The two major political parties fundamentally
disagree about what constitutes sound environmental
protection policy. Individual members of Congress are
increasingly voting on environmental lawmaking proposals
based on their party affiliation and on party policy rather than
on any notion that a particular proposal might be more or less
beneficial or costly to any single distinct geographical region.
With the exception of the northeastern United States, the
differing geographical perspectives that one might naturally
expect to generate differing policy viewpoints no longer seem so
controlling.61 The northeastern "exception" is likely explained
by the fact that the northeastern United States tends to be
downstream and/or downwind from sources of air and water
pollution, such as power plants, and, consequently, more likely
to be benefited by stricter pollution control laws on out-of-state
60. See generally EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN
REPUBLICANS (2002).
61. For example, national environmental protection and natural resource
conservation policies often have very distributional ramifications in terms of
costs and benefits that are skewed geographically. See supra note 59 and
accompanying text. Tough interstate air and water pollution control laws
impose higher costs on upstream and upwind states to the benefit of
downstream and downwind states. Resource conservation policies applicable
to resource development on public lands impose more concentrated costs on
local economies out west that have grown dependent on the maintenance of
the resource extraction industry. Of course, this is not to suggest that the
upstream and upwind states do not themselves benefit from the
environmental laws, just that they are subject to the costs and often receive
fewer of the benefits than do downstream or downwind States. Western states
similarly benefit from many of the resource conservation laws applicable to
public lands.
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pollution sources.
There is also significant evidence confirming that the
regulated community now perceives such a partisan divide in
environmental law and has, accordingly, adjusted its support of
candidates for office. In particular, an analysis of contributions
by industry subject to environmental regulation to the political
campaigns of Democrats and Republicans reveals shifts over
time that are virtually identical to the shifts in the LCV scores
of the two parties. Between 1990 and 2002, the amount of
money that the energy and natural resource industry
contributed to Democratic candidates significantly decreased
(from 42% to 26%) while the amount contributed to Republican
candidates correspondingly increased during that same time
period (from 58% to 74%).62 A more focused inquiry into the
campaign contributions of the coal industry is even more
striking. Coal industry campaign contributions went from 59%
to Republicans and 41% to Democrats in 1990, to 88% to
Republicans and 12% to Democrats in 2002.63
C. JUDICIAL BRANCH
Finally, the impact of the increasing partisan chasm on
environmental issues between the two major political parties is
not simply confined to their conduct as appointed policy makers
in the executive branch or as elected officials in the legislature.
There is reason to believe that such a partisan divide is
similarly reflected in their respective appointees to the
judiciary, as reflected in the votes of judges in individual
environmental cases as well as the substantive content of the
resulting judicial opinions. To be sure, no one has yet
undertaken a broad-based, systematic, and empirical
evaluation of the relationship, if any, between the political
party affiliation of those who appoint judges and the decisions
of those judges in environmental cases. But the handful of
those scholars who have made some effort-some based on
anecdotal evidence, some on rough sampling, and some on more
rigorous empirical data-all agree that such a politically
partisan dimension does seem to exist.
62. The Center for Responsive Politics, Energy/Natural Resources: Long-
term Contribution Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?
Ind=E (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
63. See The Center for Responsive Politics, Coal Mining: Long Term
Contribution Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=
E1210 (last visited Jan. 5, 2003).
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Much of the academic inquiry has focused on the D.C.
Circuit. The D.C. Circuit is a natural subject of academic focus
in considering the partisan nature, if any, of judicial treatment
of environmental law issues because of the central role that
court has played in environmental law. The D.C. Circuit is
unique in that respect because, by congressional design, it is
the court that considers a disproportionate number of the many
challenges to federal agency environmental decision making.
The court has jurisdiction, sometimes exclusive and sometimes
concurrent with other courts of appeals, to review
environmental agency rulemakings in the first instance on
petition for review, and in other instances simply on appeal
from lower court determinations. 64
In 1988, after examining the D.C. Circuit's record,
Professor Richard Pierce noted that many of those appointed to
the D.C. Circuit were, prior to their appointment, involved in
partisan politics. 65 Pierce further concluded that new members
of the D.C. Circuit, whether appointed by a Democratic or
Republican president, "experience[d] a difficult, and as yet
incomplete, transition from their prior active role in the
partisan political process."66  According to Pierce, "Deeply
ingrained differences in political perspective become
particularly apparent when the D.C. Circuit reviews agency
policy decisions with significant ideological implications: the
fate of a major agency policy decision reviewed by the D.C.
Circuit will vary with the composition of the panel that reviews
the agency action."67 Of particular relevance to environmental
law, Pierce further found that "[iun cases with significant
ideological implications-most major agency rulemakings-
[D]emocratic D.C. Circuit judges are more likely to reverse
agency policies at the behest of individuals, and [R]epublican
D.C. Circuit judges are more likely to reverse agency policies
challenged by business interests."68
64. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (2000) (Clean Water Act judicial review
provision); 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (2000) (Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act judicial review provision); id. § 7607(b) (Clean Air Act judicial review
provision).
65. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political
Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency
Rulemaking, 1988 DuKE L.J. 300, 300.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 302. In 1999, Professor Pierce published the results of a new
study concerning the likelihood of Democratic versus Republican appointed
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More recently, Professor Richard L. Revesz undertook an
empirical analysis of the D.C. Circuit and reached even starker
conclusions. 69 Revesz examined the specific allegation that
"judges appointed by Republican [p]residents vote principally
for laxer regulation and judges appointed by Democratic
[p]residents vote for more stringent regulation."70  Revesz
concluded that "ideology significantly influences judicial
decision making on the D.C. Circuit," especially in cases
"raising procedural challenges, that are less likely to be
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court."71 Revesz
further found that "a judge's vote (not just the panel outcome)
is greatly affected by the identity of the other judges sitting on
the panel; in fact, the party affiliation of the other judges on the
panel has a greater bearing on a judge's vote than his or her
own affiliation."72
Professors Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller reached
similar conclusions based upon their empirical examination of
the tendency of D.C. Circuit panels to defer to federal agency
administrative determinations, pursuant to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.73 Based upon their review of the more
than two hundred D.C. Circuit rulings between 1991 and 1995
in which the question of judicial deference was raised, Cross
and Tiller "found that panels controlled by Republicans were
more likely to defer to conservative agency decisions (that is, to
follow the Chevron doctrine) than were the panels controlled by
Democrats. Similarly, Democrat-controlled panels were more
D.C. Circuit judges voting to deny an environmental plaintiff standing and
found, during the period of the 1990s that he studied, that "Republican judges
voted to deny standing to environmental plaintiffs in 79.2% of cases, while
Democratic judges voted to deny standing to environmental plaintiffs in only
18.2% of cases." Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1741, 1760 (1999).
69. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997).
70. See id. at 1717-18.
71. Id. at 1719.
72. Id. Then-Chief Judge Harry Edwards vigorously challenged Professor
Revesz's conclusions, Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on
the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1343-54 (1998), which prompted a
formal reply by Revesz, see Richard Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C.
Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REV. 805, 805
(1999).
73. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175-76 (1998).
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likely to defer to liberal agency decisions than were those
controlled by Republicans."74 The authors further "found that
the presence of a whistleblower-that is, a minority member
with Chevron deference favoring the minority member's
political preference-significantly increases the chances that
the court majority will follow doctrine .... [A] partisan split
panel does not negate all partisan influences[, but] it clearly
moderates such influences."75
There are also particular structural reasons why the D.C.
Circuit may be more susceptible to political partisanship than
other courts. As Revesz explained, "Judges on the D.C. Circuit
have a far higher political profile than do federal judges
generally. Before their appointment to the bench, a
disproportionate number of them serve in Congress or in
political positions in the [e]xecutive [b]ranch."76 Moreover,
because the D.C. Circuit is the only federal appellate court of
general jurisdiction not located within a State, it is the most
likely federal court to reflect the policy-making preferences of
the president who nominates judges to that court. Unlike all
the other federal courts of appeals, there is no senator from the
District of Columbia who must be consulted and, sometimes,
assuaged during the nomination process because of a
presumption that the nominee will be a constituent (let alone a
substantial political supporter) of that member. D.C. Circuit
judges, in fact, need not be residents of the District of
Columbia.
Finally, my own less statistically rigorous review of the
environmental decisions of the United State Supreme Court
suggests the same partisan tendencies, albeit less pronounced.
While it is hard to perceive much of a distinct "environmental
protection dimension" to any of the Justices historically77 with
the exception of Justice Douglas, 78 one can nonetheless fairly
posit that a Justice appointed in current times by a Democratic
president is more likely to vote in favor of results favored by
74. Cross and Tiller, supra note 73, at 2175.
75. Id. at 2175-76.
76. Revesz, supra note 69, at 1720.
77. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental
About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 703,
716-21 (2000) (concluding that there is "too much cacophony in the votes of
individual Justices to support a thesis that environmental concerns are
generally a motivating factor in the Court's decisions").
78. See id. at 724.
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environmentalists than would a Justice appointed by a
Republican president.79  In the existing political climate,
Republican appointees to the High Court are far more likely to
be sympathetic to enhancing constitutional protections of
private property rights, restricting citizen standing to maintain
environmental lawsuits, and limiting the national govern-
ment's Commerce Clause authority to address environmental
protection and resource conservation concerns, such as
endangered species and wetlands protection. President Bush's
repeated statements during his campaign that Justices Scalia
and Thomas represent the kind of judicial philosophy he would
like to promote on the Court makes that quite clear,80 as does
the Republican Party's obvious disapproval of the voting record
of Justice Souter.8 1
In contrast, the voting records of Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, a Democratic president's most recent nominees to the
Court, place those two Justices on the opposite end of the
79. See id. at 725, 812 app. D; see also Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental
Law and the Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653,
674 app. B (2002). Of course, there are certainly counter examples both in
terms of individual Justices and specific cases. For instance, both Justice
Stevens and Justice Souter, who were appointed by Republican presidents
(Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush), tend to vote for results favored by
environmentalists, while Justice White (appointed by John F. Kennedy)
tended to vote in favor of results more supported by business interests. It is
likewise not difficult to find individual cases where even very conservative
Justices appointed by Republican presidents, such as Justice Scalia, voted in
favor of the result favored by environmentalists. See City of Chicago v.
Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 329-31 (1994). The Court's recent
unanimous rejection of industry challenges to EPA rulemaking under the
Clean Air Act certainly makes plain that the more conservative Justices
harbor no overriding antipathy to environmental protection law. See
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 459 (2000). The environ-
mental protection dimension in most cases considered "environmental" by
environmentalists, regulated industry, and environmental law specialists in
the bar and in legal academia, is simply irrelevant to the individual Justices
in their consideration of the legal issue before the Court, as it often should be.
See Lazarus, supra note 77, at 716-21. As described in the text above,
however, and elaborated upon more fully elsewhere, see id. at 744-63, there
are many cross-cutting legal issues regularly raised in environmental
lawmaking, the appreciation and proper judicial disposition of which depend
upon a judge's appreciation of the special challenges that pollution control and
resource management laws present.
80. See Neil A. Lewis, Presidential Candidates Differ Sharply on Judges
They Would Appoint to the Top Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, § 1, at 28.
81. Id. ("IT]he influential group of Republicans eagerly hoping to gain
control of the White House and the nominating procedure has adopted 'No
More Souters' as its private slogan .... ).
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environmental protection spectrum from Justices Scalia and
Thomas on virtually all of the cross-cutting constitutional law
issues of central and contemporary importance to environ-
mental law. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer favor more relaxed
approaches to standing requirements as applied to environ-
mental citizen-suit plaintiffs,8 2 a less aggressive role for the
Takings Clause as applied to environmental restrictions on
private property rights,83 and a more expansive view of
congressional Commerce Clause authority to regulate activities
affecting environmental quality. 84 Justices Scalia and Thomas,
by contrast, favor more demanding standing requirements, 85 a
more aggressive application of the Takings Clause,8 6 and a
more limited view of congressional Commerce Clause
authority.87 In the federal system, accordingly, the relevant
philosophies of prospective judicial nominees, including on
matters related to environmental law, have become routine
fodder for partisan campaigning in national elections.88
82. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2000).
83. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1484-90 (2002).
84. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159, 174-97 (2001) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 198 (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., dissenting).
86. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1496-97 (Thomas, J., joined by
Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 161-62.
88. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 80. In the states, where many judges are
subject to varied electoral processes, a judge's actual or prospective votes in
environmental cases have become a topic ofjudicial political campaigning. See
John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The
Environmental Issue in State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217,
217-21 (2001). Both environmentalists and business interests have injected
their competing concerns into judicial campaigns. See, e.g., David V. Hawpe,
Looking into the Gift Horse's Mouth, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Nov. 28, 1999, at
3D (describing how coal interests campaigned against a candidate for the
Kentucky Supreme Court because he was perceived as unduly sympathetic to
environmental protection laws); Political advertisement for the Oregon League
of Conservation Voters (2002) (on file with author) (opposing the candidacy of
David Hunnicutt for the Oregon Court of Appeals because of his anti-
environmental agenda, and posing the question, "[s]hould we let a fox guard
our henhouse?"). The problems resulting from the increased politicization of
the state judiciary has prompted state regulation of judicial campaigning. See
Republican Party v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2542-44 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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II. THE PORTENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW'S SECOND
"REPUBLICAN" MOMENT
Because of the partisan divide that now dominates
environmental law in national politics, the emergence of
environmental law's second "Republican moment," albeit the
first one with a lower rather than an uppercase "r," may well be
enormously significant in the law's evolution. Most simply put,
much of environmental law's evolution during the past thirty
years, both its successful resistance to deregulation efforts and
its persistent expansion, can be traced either to the bipartisan
appeal of environmental issues or to the divided nature of the
federal government.
Environmental law's obituary in the United States has
been written repeatedly during the past several decades, in
response to a series of powerful, seemingly overwhelming
efforts to reverse course. 89 Not long after initially embracing
environmentalism, President Richard Nixon became one of the
sharpest critics of environmental protection law.90  Nixon
advised his Cabinet to "[g]et off the environmental kick"91 and
he vetoed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, which became law only upon Congress's
override of that veto. 92 In 1980, presidential candidate Ronald
Reagan campaigned successfully on a platform openly hostile to
federal environmental protection regulations, and upon taking
office, he immediately sought to reduce substantially their
scope and reach.93 In its final year, the George H.W. Bush
administration similarly took specific aim at environmental
protection, with the President's Council on Competitiveness
89. PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE 120 (1993); Bob Benenson,
GOP Sets the 104th Congress on New Regulatory Course, 53 CONG. Q. 1693,
1693-96 (June 17, 1995); Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology-The
"Issue-Attention Cycle," 28 PUB. INT. 38, 43-46 (1972); Bill Keller, Diverse,
Established, Professional: Environmental Movement Checks Its Pulse and
Finds Obituaries Are Premature, 39 CONG. Q. 211, 211 (Jan. 31, 1981); The
Rise of Anti-Ecology, TIME, Aug. 3, 1970, at 42, 42.
90. FLIPPEN, supra note 10, at 135-37.
91. Id. at 214.
92. See 118 CONG. REC. H37054-61 (1972) (House's veto override); id. at
S36871-79 (Senate's veto override); id. at S36859-60 (president's veto
statement).
93. DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES-THE POLITICAL POWER OF
BUSINESS IN AMERICA 246-47 (1989); Raymond Tatalovich & Mark J. Wattier,
Opinion Leadership: Elections, Campaigns, Agenda Setting, and
Environmentalism, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRESIDENCY 147, 156-57 (Dennis
L. Soden ed., 1999).
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singling out environmental laws for its regulatory reform
efforts. 94 Bush ended his presidency in 1992 by seeming to
abandon his earlier support of efforts to forge international
environmental law agreements. He threatened not to attend
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, and he was the last
president of a country to agree to come. 95 Bush declined to
have the U.S. sign the Biodiversity Protocol at Rio and insisted
on a weakened version of an agreement on global climate
change. 96  The international embarrassment of U.S.
recalcitrance was so great that EPA Administrator William
Reilly wrote a memorandum to all EPA employees critical of
the administration and the president. 97
A few years later in 1995, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Newt Gingrich, and the 104th Congress
promoted the "Contract with America," deliberately designed to
cut back on environmental laws by reducing federal budgets
used for their implementation, by relaxing requirements that
states implement environmental controls, by permitting
industry to emit higher levels of pollution, and by
compensating property owners for reductions in property value
resulting from environmental restrictions. 98  Finally, as
described above, 99 the current administration of President
George W. Bush has, to date, been marked by a series of efforts
to reduce the scope and intensity of federal environmental
regulations.
In the past, none of these efforts has been successful,
largely because of the bipartisan appeal of environmental law
or the existence of separation of powers between the three
branches of government. Environmental protection law in the
94. See Keith Schneider, Administration's Regulation Slayer Has Achieved
a Perilous Prominence, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at A19.
95. Keith Schneider, Bush Plans to Join Other Leaders at Earth Summit
in Brazil in June, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1992, at A5; Keith Schneider, Bush on
the Environment: A Record of Contradictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1992, at Al.
96. Steven Greenhouse, Ecology, the Economy and Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 1992, § 4, at 1.
97. Keith Schneider, Bush Aide Assails U.S. Preparations for Earth
Summit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1992, at Al.
98. John H. Cushman Jr., Congressional Republicans Take Aim at an
Extensive List of Environmental Statutes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1995, at A14;
John H. Cushman Jr., House Approves a New Standard for Regulations, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at Al; John H. Cushman Jr., House Clears More Limits
on Environmental Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at A19; Editorial, The
GOP's War on Nature, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1995, at A20.
99. See supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
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United States has not only surmounted each major challenge,
but it seems paradoxically to have rebounded and thrived as a
result of those challenges. The premature predictions of its
demise in the mid-1970s were followed within that same decade
by congressional enactment of even more ambitious laws
relating to clean air, clean water, and the disposal of hazardous
chemicals and wastes.100 The early efforts of the Reagan
administration in the 1980s to reduce the federal role in
environmental protection ultimately yielded only the converse:
Congress adopted a series of even more demanding federal
environmental controls. 01
Likewise repudiated in the 1990s was the Contract with
America. Federal environmental protection requirements
seemed instead to become reinvigorated by that challenge,
resulting in a further tightening of pollution standards 0 2 and,
for the first time, meaningful efforts to curtail interstate
pollution 10 3 and to address the long-neglected environmental
100. Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act in 1976, added comprehensive
amendments to both the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts in 1977, and passed
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), popularly known as "Superfund," in 1980. Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795; Toxic Substances
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976); Clean Water Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566; Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-
510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
101. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (amending RCRA); Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (amending
CERCLA). See generally James Florio, Congress as Reluctant Regulator:
Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980's, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 351-53 (1986)
(noting that Congress's dissatisfaction with the recalcitrance of the Reagan
administration and the EPA spurred Congress to increase its regulatory
power).
102. During 1996, not coincidentally a presidential election year, Congress
sought to shed the "anti-environmental" image generated by the "Contract
with America" by passing two somewhat expansive amendments to federal
pesticide and safe drinking water laws. See Food Quality Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489; Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613.
103. John H. Cushman Jr., E.P.A. Acts to Require Big Cut in Air Emissions
by 22 States, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1997, at A9; John H. Cushman Jr., U.S.
Orders Cleaner Air in 22 States, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at A14; Matthew
L. Wald, E.P.A. is Ordering 392 Plants to Cut Pollution In Half, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1999, at Al.
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concerns of poor and minority communities. 104 Finally, in 2001,
partly in response to the Bush administration's initial
environmental policies, Senator James Jeffords of Vermont
stunned the nation by leaving the Republican Party to become
an Independent aligned with the Democratic Party. 10 5
Jeffords's switch allowed the Democrats to obtain majority
status in the Senate and Jeffords to become the Chair of the
Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works. 10 6
For that same reason, however, the emergence in 2003 of
this new "Republican" moment in environmental law may have
enormous portent. For the first time ever, since the beginning
of the modern environmental law era, the political appointees
and nominees to all three branches of the federal government
are effectively controlled by one political party that seems
largely united in its willingness to question and fundamentally
reform existing pollution control and resource conservation
laws. 10 7 In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, divided government
and bipartisan politics blocked major reform efforts. In the
1970s and 1980s, Democrats in Congress played a significant
role in blocking the reform efforts undertaken in the Nixon,
Reagan, and Bush administrations. 10 8 The only difference in
the 1990s was that the Republicans controlled Congress and
the Democrats controlled the executive branch; Republicans in
Congress sought the same kind of reforms that Republicans in
the executive branch had sought in the 1980s, but the
Democrats in the executive branch, rather than those in
Congress, played the critical role in blocking major reforms.'0 9
104. See Richard J. Lazarus, "Environmental Racism! That's What It Is,"
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 255, 266-73.
105. See Katherine Q. Seelye & Adam Clymer, Senate Republicans Step
Out and Democrats Jump In, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at Al.
106. Id.
107. By contrast, although the Democratic Party was the dominant party
in the late 1970s when Jimmy Carter was president, greater division existed
then than apparently does today within the Democratic Party on
environmental issues. During the first two years of the Clinton
administration, similar divisions existed within the Democratic Party, and the
federal judiciary was then dominated by Republican appointees.
108. See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, EPA Chief Is Assailed at Hearing: Gorsuch
Decries "Political' Goals Behind Criticism," WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1983, at Al;
Henry A. Waxman, The Environmental Pollution President, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 1992, at Al.
109. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of
United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's First
Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 85-88, 90-95 (2001).
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Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, the coalitions that
opposed what they perceived to be an undermining of necessary
protections included prominent Republicans as well as
Democrats. Hence, even while President Reagan enjoyed a
Republican Senate majority in the early 1980s, the Republican
senator who chaired the Senate Committee on the
Environment and Public Works, Vermont's Robert Stafford,
was a classic Northeast Republican who did not share the views
of those seeking to reduce the law's protections. Senator
Stafford and his staff worked closely with the minority
Democratic staff on the Environment Committee to block the
efforts of his own party's administration to make major changes
in the laws. In the 1990s, Speaker of the House Gingrich was
similarly stymied by Northeast Republicans both in the House,
including New York's Sherwood Boehlert, and in the Senate,
including Rhode Island's John Chafee who then chaired the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. 110
Finally, as previously described, it was yet another Northeast
Republican, James Jeffords, who stood as a barrier at the
beginning of the current Bush administration's term in office.
Two years later, the political dynamic has dramatically
shifted and in potentially historic fashion. The leadership of
the Republican Party seems fairly united, including its chairs
of the relevant legislative committees and Cabinet officials. In
the Senate, for example, Oklahoma Republican Senator James
Inhofe is replacing Independent Senator James Jeffords as
Chair of the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public
Works."1 ' New Mexico Republican Senator Pete Domenici is
replacing Democratic Senator Jeff Bingaman (also from New
Mexico) as the Chair of the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources. 12 Senator Inhofe has been a longstanding
critic of the EPA's policies and Senator Domenici has long
advocated increased resource development on public lands,
including oil and gas exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge." 13 The most recent LCV scores for Senators Inhofe and
Domenici for the First Session of the 107th Congress were a 0
and an 8, respectively, while the scores of Senators Bingaman
110. See John H. Cushman Jr., Moderates Soften G.O.P. Agenda on
Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at Al.
111. Eric Pianin & Helen Dewar, Oil, Air, Energy Laws in Play-
Environmentalists Fear New Senate, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2002, at Al.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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and Jeffords were 64 and 76, respectively. 14
Virtually the only Northeast Republican in a relevant
leadership position anywhere in the national government is
EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman from New Jersey.
Indeed, her prior stint as Governor of New Jersey is precisely
why many environmentalists were initially optimistic about her
appointment to the EPA.115 Administrator Whitman, however,
has yet to prove herself as an effective, independent
environmental policy maker in the current administration and
there is no reason to anticipate that she will change in that
respect in the next few years, assuming that she decides to
remain in the position at all.' 16 Hence, unlike in the past, there
is no apparent backstop in Congress, the executive branch, or
in the judiciary, to a substantial overhauling of the nation's
environmental protection laws.
Nor do the nation's environmental groups seem as able as
they have been in the past to prevent the accomplishment of a
major deregulatory initiative. The past successes of those
organizations have largely depended on their ability to tap into
public concerns and to lend their expertise to branches of
government sympathetic to their concerns. In the current
political environment, however, such a sympathetic
government ear is increasingly hard for environmentalists to
discover, as it is difficult for environmentalists to attract the
attention of the public, let alone, financial contributors. In the
early 1980s and again in the mid-1990s, environmental
activists quickly converted public concerns with the
environmental policies of the Reagan administration and then
with the 104th Congress into their own political muscle. The
memberships of environmental organizations dramatically
increased as did their fundraising. 17
114. LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, supra note 56, available at
http://lcv.org/pics/pdfs/scorecard02final.pdf.
115. See, e.g., David M. Halbfinger, Passion for Politics and the Outdoors-
Christine Todd Whitman, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2000, at A15.
116. See Editorial, Christie Whitman's Tribulations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
2002, at A22.
117. See JOHN B. JUDIS, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY-
ELITES, SPECIAL INTERESTS, AND THE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST 199-201
(2000). For instance, at the beginning of the 1980s, the ten leading
environmental organizations had a combined membership of 3.3 million. By
the end of the decade, they boasted 7.2 million members. Id. at 199. The
perception environmentalists promoted that the Reagan administration was
attacking federal environmental laws also boosted fundraising. Id. By 1985,
the ten leading environmental organizations had increased their combined
10312003]
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Today, no comparable massive infusion of funds and
resources seems headed to national environmental
organizations soon. Public support for strong environmental
protection measures remains strong, but two developments
have reduced the ability of the national groups to rally public
concern to bolster their resources. First, the Republican Party
has steadfastly avoided including a major reform of
environmental laws as any part of its overt political agenda.
Republicans have strategically sought to deemphasize their
policy differences with Democrats on environmental issues.
They have sought, in short, to avoid any repetition of the
political mistakes they made with sweeping rhetoric during
both the early Reagan years and the initial celebration of the
"Contract with America" a decade later.
Second, and perhaps even more fundamental, the public's
attention is simply elsewhere right now. Post-September 11th,
the more immediate threats created by the specter of a nation
going to war, coupled with increasing economic hardship, has
redirected the public's focus from the longer-term perspective of
environmental law. Both the fundraising and political
organizing abilities of environmental organizations have,
accordingly, been substantially undercut.
Finally, the changing environmental perspectives of the
federal government coupled with the changing (mis)fortunes of
the environmental community are major reasons why several
states have very recently displayed some willingness to assume
leadership roles. Just a few years ago, the major voices heard
from the states seemed to be from those voicing complaint
about the heavy-handedness of the federal government in
compelling state acceptance and administration of strict
pollution control laws. Heads of state environmental agencies
complained that the EPA was interfering with state
effectiveness, while insisting that "states are not branch offices
of the Federal Government." 1 8 The EPA publicly expressed its
skepticism of the effectiveness of some state efforts, concluding
that many states lacked either the capacity or the will to
receipt of donations to $218 million per year; by 1990, those donated sums had
more than doubled to over one-half billion dollars. Id.
118. See John H. Cushman Jr., E.P.A. and States Found to Be Lax on
Pollution Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1998, § 1, at 1; The Federal-State
Relationship: A Look into EPA Regulatory Reinvention Efforts: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Commerce,
105th Cong. (1997).
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enforce environmental requirements aggressively.1 19 The EPA
threatened on several occasions to withdraw federal approval of
state programs but rarely carried out those threats. 120
Today, the states are the ones either cajoling the federal
government to do more or are themselves initiating more
demanding regulation. Consistent with the partisan divide
now dominating environmental law, however, it is almost
exclusively Democrats that are leading the challenge to
reductions in the federal environmental role. 121  The
northeastern states (led by six Democratic attorneys general)
condemned the federal government's recent reduction of air
pollution control requirements under the Clean Air Act and
filed a lawsuit immediately after the EPA made its decision
final. 122 California, led by a Democratic governor and attorney
general, seems now to be resurrecting the leadership role that
it took in environmental law in the 1960s. California has
sought to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, a greenhouse gas
linked to global warming, stepping into an area of pollution
control that the EPA has long declined to embrace and the
current administration has retreated from altogether. 23
California has also taken a leadership position in promoting so-
called "zero-emission" motor vehicles. 124 Somewhat ironically,
the federal government has now joined with the auto industry
119. See Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation Through
the Government Performance and Results Act: Are the States Ready for the
Devolution?, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10074, 10082 (1999) (citing U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EPA AND THE STATES-ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES
REQUIRE A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP, GAO/RECD 95-64 (1995);
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. EPA, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS, APR. 1, 1997 THROUGH SEPT. 30, 1997, EPA-350-R-97-002, at 8
(1997)).
120. Id. at 10082.
121. The only significant exception is New York's Republican Governor
George Pataki, who has generally been supportive of strong environmental
protection laws, especially- those aimed at sources outside New York that
affect the quality of the environment within New York's borders. Governor
Pataki has been openly critical of the Bush administration. See Wald, supra
note 41.
122. Eric Pianin, New Pollution Standards Prompt Suit: 9 States Challenge
U.S. Decision to Relax Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2002, at Al; Katharine Q.
Seelye, 9 States in East Sue U.S. over New Pollution Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2003, at Al; Wald, supra note 41.
123. Editorial, California Leads on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at
A18; Danny Hakim, At the Front on Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2002, at Al.
124. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018(b)-(c) (West 1996); CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1962 (2001).
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in opposing California's efforts, arguing that federal law
preempts such state efforts at innovation. 2 5
CONCLUSION
I expect that I am the only person participating in this
Symposium celebration of Professor Dan Farber who knew him
when environmental law's first "republican moment" was, in
fact, underway. Dan and I first met when he was a senior at
University High School in Urbana, Illinois in the fall of 1966,
when I was a mere "subfreshman" (i.e., seventh grader) at that
same school. Then, there was no EPA and Earth Day did not
yet exist. There was no National Environmental Policy Act, 126
Clean Air Act,127  Clean Water Act,128  Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 129
Endangered Species Act of 1973,130 Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 131 Toxic Substances Control Act, 32 National
Forest Management Act,133  Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, 34  or Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act. 135 Not only was Love Canal back then just a
glimmer in Hooker Chemical's eye, but the Cuyahoga River had
not yet caught fire, and Santa Barbara had not yet borne
witness to the enormous environmental devastation caused by
a massive offshore oil spill. 136 Environmental protection then
was just emerging as a bipartisan issue with widespread public
demand for stricter pollution control and resource conservation
laws.
Whatever environmental law's missteps and inefficiencies,
125. Editorial, Retreat on Clean Air, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2002, at A20;
Katharine Q. Seelye, White House Joins Fight Against Electric Cars, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, at A20.
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000).
127. Id. §§ 7401-7671.
128. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000).
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
130. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992.
132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
133. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687.
134. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2000).
135. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2000).
136. See RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT,
MANAGING OURSELVES-A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
387 (1999); Donald G. McNeil Jr., Upstate Waste Site May Endanger Lives,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1978, at Al.
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it is clear that the legal revolution reflected in the nation's
great experiment in modern environmental law during the
ensuing decades has reaped enormous benefits for both present
and future generations of Americans. Largely because of its
strong pollution control and resource conservation laws, the
United States managed to achieve both enormous economic
growth while decreasing air and water pollution in much of the
country and at least maintaining the status quo in many other
areas. The kind of enormously destructive environmental
practices, witnessed elsewhere around the globe, were not
replicated within our borders. Our greatest lapses, ranging
from wetlands protection to species diversity, have been in
regulatory gaps rather than in excessive controls, or in our
ability simply to export environmental destruction to far off
lands-for instance, by exporting hazardous waste to
developing nations or by promoting the destruction of tropical
rainforests for livestock grazing-while enjoying the economic
fruits of that destruction here at home.
Only time will tell whether environmental law's now-
looming second "Republican moment" will be as significant for
environmental law's subsequent evolution as was its first
"republican moment." There is no doubt room for improving
environmental law by addressing past mistakes both by
reducing regulatory excesses and filling regulatory gaps. The
Republican Party now assumes the responsibility, however, to
ensure that it does not convert the opportunity for responsible
reform into an occasion for widespread repudiation of what has
been one of the nation's striking success stories in lawmaking,
once supported by prominent Republicans and Democrats alike.
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